Lost at the Appeals Tribunal and the District Court? When the Supreme Court grants leave to appeal (bar'am) in status and immigration cases.
The picture is familiar: the application was denied at a Population and Immigration Authority bureau, the internal appeal was denied, the Appeals Tribunal for immigration matters denied the appeal, and finally the District Court, sitting as the Court for Administrative Affairs, denied the administrative appeal as well — often on the papers alone, without an oral hearing. You are left holding a judgment, a demand to leave Israel, and sometimes an order for costs.
The Supreme Court does exist as a further tier, but the path to it is not an appeal as of right. The application is made by way of an application for leave to appeal (bar'am), examined under what case law calls a third round of review ("third instance"). Case law from 2025–2026 repeatedly stresses that the standard for granting leave to appeal in proceedings that originate in the Appeals Tribunal is narrow. This page explains what it takes to clear that bar, and what you can realistically expect.
The first link is the internal challenge within the Authority. Procedure 1.6.0001 (the procedure for receiving applications and appeals against decisions of the Authority's bureaus and headquarters), edition 8 of 24 Feb 2022, provides in clause ג.1 that a refusal decision must note the possibility of filing an internal appeal "without delay and no later than 21 days," while clause ב.2 clarifies that, as a rule, only one internal appeal is allowed.
The second link is an appeal to the Appeals Tribunal under section 13כד of the Entry into Israel Law, 5712-1952. The third is an administrative appeal (עמ"נ) to the District Court sitting as the Court for Administrative Affairs, under section 13לא(א) of the Entry into Israel Law and section 5(2) and item 10 of the Second Schedule to the Administrative Affairs Courts Law, 5760-2000, as settled in Adm. Appeal (Supreme Court) 3376-23 (31 Jul 2023). Regulation 22(a) of the Administrative Affairs Courts Regulations (Procedure), 5761-2000, adds that the appeal must be filed with the court in whose judicial district the Tribunal sits — not according to where you live.
Not every decision of the Tribunal can be appealed. HCJ 1787-24 (5 Mar 2024) clarified that under section 13לא, a final decision may be appealed as of right, whereas an "other decision" — only on a stay of execution or on subject-matter jurisdiction — may be appealed with leave; other interlocutory decisions, such as a decision on a motion to disqualify a judge, cannot be appealed at all.
Two similar-looking acronyms conceal an enormous gap. An Adm. Appeal (עע"מ) is an appeal as of right to the Supreme Court from a judgment of the District Court sitting as the Court for Administrative Affairs given on an administrative petition (עת"מ). Leave to appeal (בר"ם) is an application for leave to appeal — with no vested right to a hearing — from a judgment given on an administrative appeal (עמ"נ) from the judgment of the Appeals Tribunal. In status and immigration matters, where the challenge passes through the Tribunal, the route to the Supreme Court is almost always leave to appeal.
The temptation to bypass this obstacle exists, and the Supreme Court has closed it off. In Adm. Appeal (Supreme Court) 3376-23, a caregiver whose licence had been revoked filed an administrative petition instead of an administrative appeal, and even in a district other than the one where the Tribunal sits. The court held that the classification "is not a technical matter," since filing as a petition created a "bypass" that purportedly gave her a right of appeal to the Supreme Court, when in fact she should have filed an application for leave that is examined "under different and narrower standards." The proceeding was dismissed in limine.
In Leave to Appeal (Supreme Court) 71295-12-25 (10 Jun 2026), the court held that an application for leave to appeal in a third round of review ("third instance") from a judgment originating in the Appeals Tribunal will be granted only in exceptional cases — where a question of principle arises that goes beyond the parties' particular dispute, where there is a concern of a miscarriage of justice, or where exceptional circumstances exist. In the same spirit, Leave to Appeal (Supreme Court) 2433-12-24 (23 Jun 2025) stated that the standard "is narrow," and that, as a rule, leave will be granted only where a question of principle arises that goes beyond the concrete circumstances of the case, or where special circumstances exist.
This restraint is not arbitrary. Leave to Appeal (Supreme Court) 6790-23 (14 Jul 2024) explained that the standard is narrow "having regard to the nature of the Tribunal and the degree of its professionalism and expertise," and the District Court has already reviewed its decision. Added to this is a long-standing rule: an appellate court is reluctant to interfere with findings of fact and credibility — and, in the words of Leave to Appeal (Supreme Court) 71295-12-25, "all the more so in a third round of review." A further practical implication: the application may be denied without the state even being asked to respond, as happened in Leave to Appeal (Supreme Court) 27522-01-26 (2 Jul 2026), where the application was denied "without even needing a response," and consequently no costs were awarded either.
In Leave to Appeal (Supreme Court) 2433-12-24 (23 Jun 2025), it was actually the Population and Immigration Authority that applied, after the District Court had ordered it to examine a status application based on a couple relationship and to conduct an initial interview. The application was denied: the court held that the District Court had not made a ruling of principle but had merely instructed the Authority to clarify its procedures, and that this was a proceeding "directed against an application of the law alleged to be mistaken." Even the state, then, does not clear the bar when the argument is that the law was applied incorrectly.
In Leave to Appeal (Supreme Court) 71295-12-25 (10 Jun 2026), the application of a long-standing asylum seeker was denied, since "despite the applicant's attempt to cloak his application in a guise of principle," it was focused on his particular circumstances and on findings of fact and credibility. Nonetheless, the court held that the prolonged delay in deciding the asylum application was "far from satisfactory," granted 90 days during which the applicant would not be removed, and awarded no costs.
By contrast, in Leave to Appeal (Supreme Court) 48746-03-25 (12 Jan 2026), leave to appeal was granted. Three applications by caregiving-sector workers were consolidated, all concerning the interpretation of the term "other impediment" in the caregiving-sector relief document of 23 Oct 2023. The court held that at their core lay an interpretive question that went beyond the parties' own interests and required guidance from the courts; to the state's argument that the affected group was limited, the court replied that it was indeed limited but not narrow, and that the question arose "repeatedly" and sometimes led to different results across instances. An important practical detail: leave was granted only with respect to the question of principle, and no leave was granted for the accompanying procedural arguments (such as the propriety of the hearing); in the end, one of the three appeals was accepted.
A second example is Leave to Appeal (Supreme Court) 2084-24 (14 May 2025), concerning a caregiver who had stayed in Israel for decades and cared for a single patient until her death. Leave was granted not because of a question of principle but "in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice": the administrative decision rested on a partial and inaccurate factual basis regarding the appellant's ties to her country of origin, and gave insufficient weight to her exceptional bond with the patient's family. The District Court's judgment was set aside and the Tribunal's decision — an A/5 licence for a year, to be extended from time to time — was restored. An alleged miscarriage of justice must therefore rest on a concrete, documented factual basis.
A good question of principle is a well-defined legal question — usually a question of interpretation of a statutory section, a regulation, or a clause of a Procedure — whose answer will apply to many other cases, and on which the lower instances rule in different ways. Presenting conflicting rulings of District Courts on the same issue is a particularly strong element, as was done in Leave to Appeal (Supreme Court) 48746-03-25. The size of the affected group is also relevant, and it need not be large — it is enough that it is not narrow and that the question recurs.
What generally does not work: arguments directed at findings of fact, credibility, or the weighing of evidence; an argument that the lower instances erred in applying existing precedent; a general formulation of "public importance" without a sharp legal question; and particular procedural objections. In Leave to Appeal (Supreme Court) 6790-23, the application was denied because the arguments were directed mainly at factual findings in the applicants' particular case. And when the prior instance returned part of the matter for further examination by the Tribunal, the Supreme Court tends to say that the arguments will be examined there, and that the new decision can be challenged in due course.
The deadline is short. Regulation 33(b) of the Administrative Affairs Courts Regulations (Procedure), 5761-2000, allows 30 days to file an application for leave to appeal against a judgment and against an "other decision" of the District Court sitting as the Court for Administrative Affairs, and an extension is possible only for "special reasons to be recorded," under Regulation 38. In Misc. Adm. Application (Supreme Court) 7980-21 (20 Mar 2022), an application for an extension was denied, and among the considerations was the hurdle facing an applicant seeking to demonstrate prospects of success given the narrow standard in a third round of review. At the earlier stage, the Appeals Tribunal customarily notes at the end of its judgment that the right of appeal to the District Court stands at 45 days.
Filing an application for leave to appeal does not by itself stay removal proceedings; a separate application for interim relief or an interim order must be filed and properly justified. In Leave to Appeal (Supreme Court) 71295-12-25, an interim order was issued preventing removal until further decision, whereas in Leave to Appeal (Supreme Court) 6790-23 the application for interim relief was denied together with the application itself, among other things because the applicants had not addressed the balance of convenience or the prospects of the proceeding at all; the full rules are set out in a separate guide on this site.
The picture on costs is mixed: in Leave to Appeal (Supreme Court) 6790-23, the applicants were ordered to pay ILS 3,000, whereas in Leave to Appeal (Supreme Court) 27522-01-26 and Leave to Appeal (Supreme Court) 2433-12-24, no order for costs was made at all.
The decision whether to file an application for leave to appeal is a legal-and-financial decision, not an emotional one. Most applications in status cases are denied, some without the state even being asked to respond, and sometimes together with an order for costs. On the other hand, where the case carries a recurring legal question, or where a mistaken factual basis can be shown to have led to a particularly harsh outcome, there is a real chance.
Before filing, it is worth examining three questions: is there a legal question that can be framed in a single sentence and that also matters to someone who is not a party to the case; can conflicting case law or inconsistent application on the same issue be shown; and is there a faster alternative remedy — a new application to the Authority due to a change of circumstances, or an application to the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Humanitarian Affairs. When the answer to the first two is negative, it is generally preferable to invest the resources in an alternative route.
Our office accompanies status applicants and their family members through the entire chain of challenge — from the internal appeal within the Authority, through the appeal to the Appeals Tribunal and the administrative appeal, up to an honest assessment of whether to approach the Supreme Court. We read the judgments given in your case, identify whether they contain a question of principle that can be properly framed, or a flaw giving rise to a concern of a miscarriage of justice, check the deadlines and the need for interim relief to prevent removal, and tell you openly what the prospects of the proceeding are before it is filed. Where the conclusion is that an application for leave to appeal is not the right route, we will propose the most practical alternative in the circumstances of the case.
An application for leave to appeal (bar'am) is an application to the Supreme Court for leave to appeal a judgment of the District Court sitting as the Court for Administrative Affairs, given on an administrative appeal (עמ"נ) from the judgment of the Appeals Tribunal. Unlike an appeal as of right, you have no vested right to have the matter heard — the court first decides whether to grant leave at all. In status and immigration matters this is almost always the route to the Supreme Court, because a challenge to the Authority's decision passes through the Appeals Tribunal.
Under Leave to Appeal (Supreme Court) 71295-12-25 (10 Jun 2026), leave to appeal in a third round of review in proceedings originating in the Appeals Tribunal will be granted only in exceptional cases: where a question of principle arises that goes beyond the parties' particular dispute, where there is a concern of a miscarriage of justice, or where exceptional circumstances exist. Leave to Appeal (Supreme Court) 2433-12-24 (23 Jun 2025) stressed that the standard is "narrow." An argument that the lower instances erred in applying the law, or an objection to findings of fact and credibility, is generally not enough.
Regulation 33(b) of the Administrative Affairs Courts Regulations (Procedure), 5761-2000, sets 30 days for filing an application for leave to appeal against a judgment and against an "other decision" of the District Court sitting as the Court for Administrative Affairs. An extension is possible only for "special reasons to be recorded," under Regulation 38, and in Misc. Adm. Application (Supreme Court) 7980-21 (20 Mar 2022), such an application was denied, among other things because of the low prospects of a proceeding in a third round of review. It is advisable to check the exact deadline as soon as the judgment is received.
Not automatically. A separate application for interim relief or an interim order must be filed and justified, including the balance of convenience and the prospects of the proceeding. In Leave to Appeal (Supreme Court) 71295-12-25, an interim order was issued preventing removal until further decision, whereas in Leave to Appeal (Supreme Court) 6790-23 (14 Jul 2024) the application for interim relief was denied together with the application, among other things because the applicants had not addressed these considerations at all. There is a separate guide on this site on this subject.
No. In Adm. Appeal (Supreme Court) 3376-23 (31 Jul 2023), the Supreme Court held that classifying the proceeding as an administrative petition instead of an administrative appeal "is not a technical matter," and that filing as a petition creates a "bypass" that ostensibly confers a right of appeal to the Supreme Court instead of an application for leave that is examined "under different and narrower standards." The proceeding there was dismissed in limine. In addition, under Regulation 22(a) of the Regulations, the administrative appeal is filed in the district where the Tribunal whose decision is being appealed sits.