Refused and told to leave Israel before your humanitarian request is reviewed? A guide to Procedure 5.2.0022's exception and how to appeal. We can help.
You have been living in Israel for years. In the past you filed a request for status — asylum, a couple relationship, caregiving, or a humanitarian request (application for status on special humanitarian grounds) — it was refused, and the refusal decision included a requirement to leave the country. You may also have filed an internal appeal or an appeal, and a judgment left the refusal in place. Meanwhile years have passed, circumstances have changed, and you now want to file a new request on special humanitarian grounds. The answer you get is not a decision on the merits of the request, but a single sentence: the request will be reviewed only after you leave Israel.
This answer is not arbitrary, and it is not the end of the road either. It rests on an explicit clause of the Procedure, which is a rule — and every rule has its exception. But the exception is narrow, and case law has established that it must be presented before the request is even filed. Anyone who misses this window finds a closed door both at the bureau and at the Tribunal.
The framework is the Entry into Israel Law, 5712-1952, under which a foreign national has no vested right to reside in Israel, and the authority to grant visas rests with the Minister of Interior, subject to broad discretion. The handling of humanitarian requests is governed by Procedure 5.2.0022 (Inter-Ministerial Committee Procedure — Procedure for Handling Requests for Status on Special Humanitarian Grounds), edition 19, in the version updated on 23 Apr 2026. Clause ג.1 defines it as a residual procedure.
Clause ג.2 is the clause encountered by those who have already been refused. Under it, where an applicant residing in Israel has previously received an administrative decision refusing a request for status together with an exit requirement, or a judgment that left the refusal in place — "as a rule, the request for status under this Procedure will be reviewed only after the applicant leaves Israel. Exceptional cases departing from the rule require consultation with the regional director." It makes no difference whether the earlier request was filed under this Procedure or under another one. A parallel provision appears in clause ג.1.ד(3) of Procedure 1.6.0001 (the Procedure for Receiving Requests and Appeals against Decisions of the Bureaus and Headquarters of the Population and Immigration Authority).
It is important to understand the nature of this decision: as emphasized in Appeal (Beer Sheva) 3270-25 (10 Jun 2026), it does not "amount to a rejection of the humanitarian request on its merits, but rather a clear statement that the request will be handled only after the applicant leaves the country."
The word "as a rule" is the foothold for anyone seeking to remain, but it does not open a wide door. In Adm. Appeal (Beer Sheva) 16105-06-23 (18 Jul 2023) it was held that it is doubtful whether the use of this word necessarily indicates recognition of exceptions, and in any event anyone seeking to be recognized as an exception "must prove this already in the application to the Authority for an appointment, before filing the request" — otherwise "the clause would be emptied of content."
The practical conclusion is sharp: the application for an appointment is the first and most important legal opportunity. It must already detail the exceptional circumstances and attach supporting evidence — medical documents, an opinion from a qualified professional, and documentation from education and welfare bodies. In that case, not a single medical document was attached to the application, and a psychiatric opinion was submitted only at the hearing on the request for an interim order.
The other side of the coin is no less important: when exceptional circumstances are in fact placed before the Authority, it must examine them and not merely recite the rule. In Adm. Appeal (Tel Aviv) 37633-06-25 (9 Jul 2025), an appeal by the parents of three minor daughters born in Israel was granted: neither the Authority nor the Tribunal ever asked whether this was an exceptional case warranting consultation with the regional director — "this was not done. This must be done."
The exit requirement is not necessarily the only obstacle. Clauses א.3 and ג.1.ה of Procedure 1.6.0001 provide that the request of anyone against whom costs were awarded in legal proceedings in favor of the Authority will not be handled until the debt is paid; clause ג.1.ז allows requesting that this condition be waived on financial grounds — a topic we discuss at length in a separate guide.
At the same time, clause ה.9 of Procedure 5.2.0022 lists grounds for threshold dismissal at the bureau, without referral to the Inter-Ministerial Committee — among them a request based on identical arguments already rejected in the past, and a request from someone who infiltrated Israel where there are, on their face, no grounds justifying continued review at headquarters. The rules for filing a repeat request are likewise discussed in a separate guide. Finally, clause א.2 of Procedure 1.6.0001 provides that merely filing a request or an internal appeal — or even obtaining an appointment — does not prevent removal or placement in detention, unless a judicial decision staying enforcement has been issued.
Most requests that run into clause ג.2 rely on children who were born in Israel and are studying here. The argument is genuine, but it is subject to two recurring rules. The first — "a minor follows his parents" (HCJ 4156/01 Dimitrov v. Ministry of Interior); otherwise, as stated in Appeal (Tel Aviv) 2163-26 (16 Jun 2026), it would follow that birth in Israel by itself confers status. The second — "a minor depends on his parents, and the parents do not depend on him" (HCJ 758/88 Kandel v. Ministry of Interior), from which it follows that a parent cannot build their own status on the humanitarian grounds of their child; in Appeal (Jerusalem) 3325-25 (5 Aug 2026), an appeal by a mother and her two sons was dismissed on this basis.
Even many years of residence and integration into society are not enough: case law requires "something more" (Adm. Appeal (Supreme Court) 1086/09 Cruz v. Minister of Interior), and concrete, special harm "that goes beyond the bounds of the unavoidable harm always caused by the withholding of a permit or license" (Adm. Appeal (Supreme Court) 3091/21, as quoted in Appeal 3325-25). In both of these appeals, private social work opinions were rejected — in one because it was prepared only after the decision, and in the other because the extent of the opinion-writer's familiarity with the family was not detailed and no unique harm was shown. By contrast, in Adm. Appeal 37633-06-25 it was held that the passage of time, during which the minors grew up and their case was never examined in depth, was itself the new circumstance justifying review.
Anyone appealing a decision made under clause ג.2 almost always also requests an interim order to prevent enforcement proceedings pending a ruling. The considerations are the prospects of the proceeding and the balance of convenience — which is usually the central one — together with, under Section 13(27) of the Entry into Israel Law, good faith and clean hands.
The decision in Appeal (Tel Aviv) 2163-26 illustrates the bar. The request was denied on three grounds: lack of clean hands, including concealment of facts and breach of undertakings that had led to the forfeiture of guarantees; delay — no explanation was given for why the applicants had not left Israel during the years in which they were unprotected; and the balance of convenience — since they had not been protected before, there was no reason this situation should not continue while the appeal was being examined, and an order directing the Authority to refrain from exercising a statutory power is in substance similar to a mandatory order. In the final judgment in that case (25 Aug 2026), the appeal was struck out because the appellants' details were not provided as required by the Entry into Israel Regulations (Procedure and Administration in the Appeals Tribunal), 5774-2014.
There is, however, a middle path. In the judgment concluding Appeal (Tel Aviv) 1248-25 (28 Dec 2025), the Tribunal insisted on departure from Israel, but balanced the concern of an unlimited period abroad: within 90 days of departure the Authority must reach a decision following an interview, and if it fails to meet that deadline, the appellant would be permitted to re-enter Israel subject to a guarantee. Such relief is worth requesting explicitly.
Every decision under the humanitarian Procedure is delivered in writing by registered mail and is reasoned, noting the possibility of challenging it (clauses ג.6 and ה.7 of Procedure 5.2.0022). The first stage is an internal appeal under Procedure 1.6.0001: in writing, without delay and no later than 21 days from receipt of the decision, at the bureau where the decision was made, and free of charge. An appeal filed late will not be handled, and as a rule only one internal appeal may be filed.
Next, an appeal is filed with the Appeals Tribunal for immigration matters under Section 13(24) of the Entry into Israel Law, within the statutory deadline (30 days from delivery of the decision). A judgment of the Tribunal may be challenged by an administrative appeal to the District Court sitting as the Court for Administrative Affairs within 45 days; an interim decision may be challenged by an application for leave to appeal. At every stage, interim relief must be requested explicitly.
A practical note: when the real obstacle is an urgent medical condition, the appropriate track is not the Inter-Ministerial Committee but Procedure 5.2.0038 (Handling a Request to Delay Removal in a Medical Emergency), as clarified in Adm. Appeal 16105-06-23.
In Appeal (Tel Aviv) 2163-26 (16 Jun 2026), parents and their minor son sought to regularize status after years of unlawful residence, refusal decisions, and forfeited guarantees. The Tribunal denied the request for interim relief and held that a general claim that the child "grew up and became accustomed to Israel" is not enough. The lesson: a history of failing to comply with decisions is an independent legal consideration.
In Appeal (Tel Aviv) 1248-25 (18 Feb 2025), a request based on a couple relationship was filed only a few months after a judgment requiring the appellant to leave. The Tribunal held that anyone seeking to be considered an exception must detail this already in their application, and added that "an alleged couple relationship alone is not enough" and that a cardinal change of circumstances is required.
In Appeal (Beer Sheva) 3270-25 (10 Jun 2026), an appellant who had agreed, in an administrative appeal, to leave Israel applied about two months later for an appointment for a humanitarian request. It was held that this was not an exceptional case warranting consultation with the regional director, and that this conduct reflected a lack of good faith. The lesson: the timing of the application is itself evidence.
By contrast, in Adm. Appeal (Jerusalem) 74444-11-24 (18 May 2025) the request was examined from within Israel, after an earlier proceeding had established that it would be reviewed without requiring the mother and daughter to leave. The request was denied, and on appeal the Director-General's decision and the Tribunal's judgment were both set aside, with the matter remanded to the Inter-Ministerial Committee. The lesson: when the exception is established in real time and by a judicial decision, the entire track looks different.
Our office guides status applicants and Israeli family members through exactly this juncture. We first examine the full administrative file — what the earlier refusal decisions said, which judgments were issued, whether a cost debt remains, and what undertakings were given in the past — and only then formulate the application for an appointment, so that the exceptional circumstances and supporting evidence are placed before the Authority from the outset rather than after the fact. In appropriate cases we work to settle the cost debt, request interim relief at the right time, and propose interim solutions such as setting a deadline for a decision after departure. We represent clients in the internal appeal, the appeal to the Tribunal, and the administrative appeal, and we tell you in advance what is reasonable to expect — without promising outcomes.
No. A decision under clause ג.2 of Procedure 5.2.0022 is a decision about the timing of the review, not about its substance. In Appeal (Beer Sheva) 3270-25 (10 Jun 2026) it was emphasized that this does not amount to a rejection of the humanitarian request on its merits, but rather a determination that it will be handled only after leaving the country. That said, in practical terms the outcome is similar as long as you do not leave, so it is important to act through the right channel and at the right time.
The closing part of clause ג.2 recognizes "exceptional cases departing from the rule," for which consultation with the regional director is required. Case law has required genuinely exceptional circumstances, not merely a wish to stay — for example, an unusual medical deterioration since the exit requirement was imposed, or particularly severe family circumstances that arose afterward. Adm. Appeal (Tel Aviv) 37633-06-25 (9 Jul 2025) clarified that when such circumstances are presented, the Authority must examine them and consult as required, rather than merely reciting the rule.
Already in the application for an appointment, before filing the request itself. This was held in Adm. Appeal (Beer Sheva) 16105-06-23 (18 Jul 2023), on the reasoning that if the grounds for the exception are detailed only in the body of the request, the clause would be emptied of content. The application letter should therefore detail the circumstances and attach supporting evidence — medical documents, an opinion from a qualified professional, and relevant documentation — rather than being a merely technical request for an appointment.
Not by itself. The rule is that "a minor follows his parents," and, at the same time, that "a minor depends on his parents, and the parents do not depend on him" — meaning a parent cannot base their own status on the humanitarian grounds of their child. Case law requires "something more" beyond long residence and integration, and concrete, special harm going beyond the unavoidable harm inherent in any removal. An opinion prepared only after the decision, or one that does not detail the extent of the writer's familiarity with the family, tends to be given little weight.
You must request interim relief explicitly — merely filing the request or the appeal does not stay removal, as provided in clause א.2 of Procedure 1.6.0001. The Tribunal will consider the prospects of the proceeding and the balance of convenience, together with good faith and clean hands. Unexplained delay, breach of prior undertakings, and failure to provide details as required by the regulations weigh heavily against the applicant, as shown in Appeal (Tel Aviv) 2163-26. In appropriate cases, one can request, as an interim solution, that the Authority be given a set deadline to decide after departure from Israel.