A parent's naturalization also grants citizenship to a minor child living in Israel that day, even without status. Conditions, timing, and alternative routes.
Many people come to us precisely after the hard part is already behind them: a foreign spouse married to an Israeli citizen has completed the graduated process, declared allegiance, and received a certificate of naturalization. Then it turns out that the child — a son or daughter from a previous marriage — has been left without status. Sometimes the child holds an expired visitor's licence; sometimes there is nothing at all. At the local office you are directed to file an application for status on humanitarian grounds, and there, before the Inter-Ministerial Committee, the criteria are narrow.
In quite a few cases, that is not the only route. The Citizenship Law, 5712-1952, sets out a separate, more lenient path for the minor children of a person who has naturalized — Section 8. This is not a humanitarian route and it does not rest on broad discretion: it sets conditions, and whoever meets them, meets them.
The wording of the section is brief: "The naturalization of a person also grants citizenship to his minor child who, on the day of the naturalization, was a resident of Israel or a resident of an area held by the Israel Defense Forces, and whom the naturalized person was entitled to hold." Subsection (b) adds a proviso: if the minor was a foreign citizen and both of his parents were entitled to hold him but only one of them naturalized, citizenship will not be granted to him if one of the parents declared that he does not wish the child to be an Israeli citizen.
The Supreme Court has read Section 8(a) as containing two cumulative conditions: that the child be the child of a "naturalized" parent entitled to hold him, and that he be a "resident of Israel" or a resident of the area (Adm. Appeal (Supreme Court) 9102/12 Kuzmina v. Ministry of Interior (26 Aug 2014), para. 12). Years later the conditions were formulated as follows: at the time of the naturalization, the minor's centre of life was in Israel or in the area, and the naturalized parent "was entitled to hold him." In the same paragraph it was emphasized that Section 8(a) eases the acquisition of citizenship and creates a structured route, unlike Section 9(a)(1) of the Law, which leaves the Minister of Interior broad discretion (Adm. Appeal (Supreme Court) 348/21 (4 Jul 2022), para. 9).
A further threshold condition has been added to these: the "naturalization" referred to in the section is specifically naturalization under Sections 5 through 7 of the Law, and not the acquisition of citizenship by any other route (Further Hearing (Supreme Court) 5331/24 (7 Dec 2025)).
Administrative handling of these applications is governed by Procedure 4.4.0001 (Naturalization under Sections 5, 6, and 8), updated on 10 May 2026.
The condition that trips up many applications is the residency requirement, and it is precisely here that case law has taken an expansive approach. In HCJ 3353/18 (22 Sep 2020), the Ministry of Interior argued that "resident of Israel" means lawful status, i.e., a residency licence. The Court rejected this: the minutes of the Constitution Committee at the time of the 1968 amendment to the Law show that the legislature knowingly chose the term "resident," despite a proposal to base the definition on formal status, and that the purpose of the section is the minor's genuine connection to the State and to the parent (paras. 30-31).
The conclusion was stated in paragraph 37: "There is no justification for distinguishing between a minor whose status is not regularized and a minor who holds a residency licence under the Entry into Israel Law. A minor who has put down roots in the country, and who is in the custody of the naturalized parent, should be allowed, together with his parent, to enjoy a sense of security." The petition was granted and the State was ordered to grant the child citizenship.
The practical significance: the fact that the child's status has not been regularized, and even that he is staying in Israel unlawfully, does not by itself rule out the application of Section 8. What is examined is the actual centre of life — residence, schooling, and ties.
Section 8(a) specifies a single date — "the day of the naturalization." In Kuzmina it was held that the phrase "the naturalization of a person" refers to the date on which the parent obtained the status of citizen, and that the child's entitlement arises only after the parent's naturalization process has been successfully completed (para. 13); the question of the minor's residency is examined on the day citizenship is granted to the minor, not at the time of entry into the graduated process (para. 15).
Two conclusions follow. First, a child whose centre of life was not in Israel on the day the parent received citizenship does not come within the section's scope. This was held recently: the mother received citizenship on 13 Aug 2017, while the son began living in Israel permanently only at the end of 2018; it was held that his centre of life was not in Israel on the operative date, and therefore there was no basis for a claim under Section 8(a) (Adm. Appeal (Jerusalem) 9661-06-26 (2 Sep 2026)).
Second, the child must be a minor on that date — but a child who was lawfully joined to his parent's process and came of age during it will not lose his entitlement on that account: in Kuzmina it was held that entitlement arises at the conclusion of the graduated process even if by that stage the child has become an adult.
When a child has two parents entitled to hold him and only one of them has naturalized, Section 8(b) gives the other parent a "veto right." In Kuzmina it was emphasized that the law does not require express consent but only the absence of an objection (paras. 19 and 25), and that a procedure requiring active consent departs from the enabling statute and cannot stand (paras. 26-27). It was further held that the other parent's "window of opportunity" to object is limited to the period of minority: once the child comes of age, the parent no longer has a right to object, provided he had not objected before then (para. 29).
The Procedure implements this by way of notice. Under clause 11.2 of Procedure 4.4.0001, a written notice is sent to the other parent, at the address provided by the naturalized parent, stating that an application for Israeli citizenship has been filed for the minor and that the parent may object. Clause 11.3 provides that the notice will be sent by registered mail to a parent staying in Israel and through an Israeli mission to a parent abroad, that a six-month waiting period for a response must be observed and the process may not be concluded during that period, and that the absence of a response within that period will be treated as the absence of an objection.
In practice, this is where many applications fail. The Appeals Tribunal for immigration matters held that a parent who gave no notice at all to the other biological parent cannot benefit from the fact that the child has since come of age, since Kuzmina concerned a parent who knew and chose to remain silent (Appeal (Tel Aviv) 3902-23 (17 Jul 2024), paras. 25-26 and 35).
If the conditions are not met — including where the parent received citizenship as an oleh (immigrant under the Law of Return) under the Law of Return, 5710-1950, and not by way of naturalization — three routes remain, differing in character. In Further Hearing (Supreme Court) 5331/24 it was emphasized that the Authority retains other tools: Section 9(a) of the Citizenship Law and the arrangements under the Entry into Israel Law (para. 96).
Grant of citizenship to a minor under Section 9(a)(1) — a route subject to the broad discretion of the Minister of Interior, governed by Procedure 4.5.0001. The Procedure generally requires that both of the minor's parents be Israeli citizens and residents whose centre of life is in Israel (clause b.1), the consent of both parents or a judgment awarding sole custody (clause b.4), and that the minor be a resident of Israel who has settled there and resided there as a resident (A/5 or permanent) for three of the five years preceding the application (clause b.5). A temporary licence granted on humanitarian grounds is not a ground for the grant (clause b.5.3).
Joining as an accompanying minor to the graduated process — as long as the parent is still in the graduated process, the child can be joined under Procedure 5.2.0008. At the stage of concluding the process, the Procedure instructs that the accompanying minor's age be checked and that the file be verified to contain no objection notice from the other parent, and it provides that an accompanying minor who came of age during the process must file a separate application.
Application for status on humanitarian grounds — a residual procedure before the Inter-Ministerial Committee. This is not a right, and the burden of showing a humanitarian ground rests on the applicant for status.
A written internal appeal within the Authority may be filed against the local office's decision, without delay and no later than 21 days, under Procedure 1.6.0001. The decision on the internal appeal may be appealed to the Appeals Tribunal for immigration matters under the Entry into Israel Law, 5712-1952, within the time set by law, and the Tribunal's judgment may be appealed to the District Court sitting as the Court for Administrative Affairs within 45 days. In appropriate cases, an interim order should be sought to prevent enforcement pending a decision.
And here is the point that repeatedly trips people up: an argument under Section 8 must be raised before the Authority and before the Tribunal, not for the first time on appeal. In Adm. Appeal (Jerusalem) 9661-06-26 (2 Sep 2026), the appellants raised for the first time on appeal an argument that the Authority should have examined an alternative route under Section 8(a). The Court dismissed it as a new argument not raised at the appeal stage, and added that it was also unfounded on the merits: these are two separate routes resting on different statutory provisions.
In Further Hearing (Supreme Court) 5331/24 (7 Dec 2025), the Supreme Court, sitting in an expanded panel of seven justices, decided who is the "naturalized person" that Section 8 refers to. A father who had converted abroad immigrated to Israel and received citizenship under the Law of Return, and later sought citizenship for seven of his children. By a majority of six justices against one, it was held that the child of a person who acquired citizenship by way of return does not come within the gates of Section 8, and that the "naturalization" referred to in the section is only the specific route under Sections 5 through 7 of the Law (paras. 30 and 97 of the judgment of Deputy President Sohlberg). The decision turned on the parent's route, not on the minor's residency condition. The lesson: first check how the parent obtained his citizenship — as an oleh or as a naturalized person.
In HCJ 3353/18 (22 Sep 2020), a daughter who was born in Israel and whose status was not regularized had been excluded from her father's naturalization. It was held that "resident of Israel" is examined by reference to the centre of life and not to formal status, and the order was made absolute. The lesson: do not give up on Section 8 merely because the child's status is not regularized.
In Kuzmina (Adm. Appeal (Supreme Court) 9102/12, 26 Aug 2014), a minor joined her mother, while the father who remained in Russia had given consent limited in time and for study purposes only, and the Ministry of Interior demanded active consent and refused to join her. It was held that the law requires only the absence of an objection, that a procedure cannot impose stricter requirements than the enabling statute, and that once the daughter came of age the father no longer had a right to object; the appeal was allowed. The lesson: the other parent's silence, after being lawfully notified, may work in your favour.
In Appeal (Tel Aviv) 3902-23 (17 Jul 2024), the appellants gave no notice at all to the biological father, argued that they did not know his details, and asked that the son's coming of age exempt them from the requirement. The appeal was dismissed: the absence of notice is not cured by the passage of time. The lesson: satisfy the notice requirement in real time and document your efforts to locate the parent.
We first examine the question no one else examined: whether, on the day the parent received citizenship, the child met the conditions of Section 8 — a centre of life in Israel, and the parent's right to hold him. If so, we approach the Authority on the correct route, guide the process of notifying the other parent, and build the evidentiary foundation for the centre of life: schooling records, medical treatment, residence, and documentation of border crossings. If the conditions are not met, we examine the alternative routes and present the full arguments already before the Authority and the Tribunal, so that they are not blocked on procedural grounds. At every stage we will give you a sober assessment of the prospects, without promises.
No. Section 8(a) of the Citizenship Law grants citizenship to a minor child only if, on the day of the parent's naturalization, his centre of life was in Israel or in the area, and a child who remained abroad on that day does not come within the section. A further threshold question is how you yourself obtained citizenship: in Further Hearing (Supreme Court) 5331/24 (7 Dec 2025), it was held that Section 8 applies only to a person who naturalized under Sections 5 through 7 of the Law, and not to a person who received citizenship as an oleh under the Law of Return. In such cases, other routes should be examined, including an application for grant of citizenship to a minor under Section 9(a)(1) of the Law (Procedure 4.5.0001) or an application for status on humanitarian grounds.
Not necessarily. In HCJ 3353/18 (22 Sep 2020), it was held that there is no justification for distinguishing between a minor whose status is not regularized and a minor holding a residency licence, and that "resident of Israel" for purposes of Section 8 is examined by reference to the actual centre of life. It is still necessary to prove that the child's centre of life was in Israel on the day of the naturalization, so it is important to gather evidence of residence, schooling, and ties well in advance.
The law requires the absence of an objection, not express consent, as held in Kuzmina (Adm. Appeal (Supreme Court) 9102/12, 26 Aug 2014). Procedure 4.4.0001 provides that the Authority will send the other parent written notice of the application and of his ability to object, will wait six months for a response, and will treat the absence of a response within that period as the absence of an objection. It is important to provide the Authority with an address and to document efforts to locate the parent — the Appeals Tribunal has rejected arguments raised where there was no notice at all.
Not necessarily, and it depends on the route. In Kuzmina it was held that the entitlement of a lawfully joined minor arises at the conclusion of the parent's naturalization even if by that stage he is already an adult, and that the other parent's right to object expires when he turns 18. On the other hand, Procedure 5.2.0008 requires an accompanying minor who comes of age during the graduated process to file a separate application, and Procedure 4.5.0001 directs that a grant application for a minor who has come of age be converted into naturalization under Section 5 of the Law.
It is better not to reach this situation. In Adm. Appeal (Jerusalem) 9661-06-26 (2 Sep 2026), an argument under Section 8(a) raised for the first time on appeal was dismissed, in part because it had not been argued at the appeal stage, and the Court emphasized that these are two separate routes resting on different statutory provisions. If Section 8 is relevant to your case, it must be raised already in the application to the Authority and in the notice of appeal to the Tribunal.